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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
CALVIN LEE NIXON,
Appellant/Petitioner,
CaseNo.20071004-CA
STATE OF UTAH,
Appellee/Respondent.
BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Nixon appeals from the dismissal of a petition for post-conviction relief in the
Second Judicial District, Weber County, the Honorable Pamela G. Heffeman presiding.
This Court has jurisdiction over the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(f)
(West 2008).
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Did the post-conviction court correctly conclude that Nixon failed to demonstrate
a meritorious claim or an acceptable reason for his untimely filing and therefore did not
meet the "interests of justice" exception to the Post Conviction Remedies Act (PCRA)
time bar?
Standard of Review. An appellate court "review[s] an appeal from an order
dismissing or denying a petition for post-conviction relief for correctness without
deference to the lower court's conclusions of law." Benvenuto v. State, 2007 UT 53, ^[ 9,

165 P.3d 1195 (internal quotation marks omitted). The court "review[s] a lower court's
purely factual findings for clear error, but review[s] the application of the law to the facts
for correctness." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The texts of Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-35a-104 through 107 (West 2004) and Rule
65C, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, are attached as Addendum A.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Criminal proceedings. The State originally charged Nixon with attempted
murder, a second degree felony. R54. Nixon was represented by two attorneys, Geoffrey
L. Clark and Kristopher K. Greenwood. R57. Nixon pleaded guilty to aggravated
assault, a second degree felony. R67. The court, however, agreed to allow Nixon "to
withdraw his plea at the time of sentencing if the Court d[id] not agree with the
recommendation from Adult Probation and Parole [AP&P]." R76; see also R71.

Nixon

moved to withdraw this plea, apparently because the trial court did not agree with
AP&P's sentencing recommendation, and the trial court granted his motion. R79.
On August 31, 2004, the State filed an amended information charging Nixon with
aggravated assault, a third degree felony; Nixon pleaded guilty to the amended charge;
and the trial court sentenced Nixon to a prison term of 0 to 5 years. R83, 86, 93-94. The
court signed and filed the judgment on September 2, 2004. R94. Judge Pamela G.
Heffernan conducted the criminal proceedings in the Second District Court, Weber
County. R93-94.

2

Nixon did not file a motion to withdraw his plea and did not file a direct appeal.
&>eR123.
Proceedings on extraordinary writ. On May 16, 2006, Nixon's current counsel
filed a petition in the Second District, Weber County, for a writ of coram nobis in the
underlying criminal case, alleging that trial counsel, Geoffrey Clark, was ineffective.
R96-103. The petition alleged that counsel had used drugs, failed to maintain contact
with Nixon, failed to inform Nixon that he had a self-defense claim, and failed to raise
the self-defense claim. Id. Judge Heffernan denied the writ on June 1,2006, advising
Nixon that the appropriate procedure for his claims was the Post-Conviction Remedies
Act. R106. On June 19,2006, the court denied Nixon's motion for reconsideration of
this ruling. R109.
Post-conviction proceedings. On July 13,2006, Nixon's current counsel filed a
petition for writ of habeas corpus and a memorandum in support of that motion in the
Third District Court. R8-16. Defendant again claimed that trial counsel was ineffective
for the reasons alleged in his earlier coram nobis writ petition. Id. On September 20,
2006, the Third District Court ordered the petition transferred to the Second District
Court. R20, 22. The petition was assigned to the Second District Court and apparently
received in Davis County on or before May 3, 2007. R24. It was then transferred to the
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Second District Court, Weber County, and received by Judge Heffernan on May 25,
2007.1 R24,27.
The State moved to dismiss Nixon's petition as untimely. R31-35. Nixon did not
deny that his petition was untimely, but argued in his response that his untimely filing
should be excused in the "interests of justice." R143-48. On October 25,2007, the postconviction court, Judge Heffernan presiding, announced its decision to dismiss the
petition and requested that the State prepare the appropriate order. Rl 62-69 (Ruling
Granting State's Motion to Dismiss, attached as Addendum B).
On November 21, 2007, before the order was prepared, signed, and entered, Nixon
appealed. See R172. On July 14, 2008, the court of appeals temporarily remanded the
case for entry of a final order. R189.
On May 12, 2008, between Nixon's appeal and the temporary remand, the district
court entered a final order. See Rl 79-88 (Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and
Order Dismissing Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, attached as Addendum C). The
district court ruled that the petition was untimely, but observed that a court may excuse
an untimely filing in the "interests] of justice." R182. The court declined to excuse
Nixon's untimely filing, however, concluding that Nixon's ineffectiveness claims lacked

1

Rule 65 C, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, requires that the petition be filed with
"the district court in the county in which the judgment of conviction was entered" and
that it be assigned "to the judge who sentenced the petitioner." Utah R. Civ. P.
65C(b)&(f).
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merit and that he had provided no adequate explanation for his delay in filing his petition.
R185-86.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
"Officers responded to a report of a family fight. The victim stated that [Nixon]
tried to stab her with a knife. He also choked her during the altercation." R112. Nixon
"stated under Miranda that a knife had been involved in the altercation." Id.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The post-conviction court correctly concluded that Nixon had not proffered
evidence sufficient to establish that the "interests of justice" excused his failure to file his
ineffective assistance claim within the statutory time limitations.
To meet the "interests of justice" exception, a petitioner must be able to
demonstrate that his claim is meritorious and that he had a good reason for filing his
petition late. Nixon did not proffer facts to show that he had a meritorious claim. Nixon
argued that trial counsel was ineffective for not presenting a self-defense claim, for not
returning phone calls and visiting more often, for likely being "high on drugs" at the time
of Nixon's decision to plead guilty and at the change-of-plea and sentencing hearing, for
subsequently having been convicted of drug crimes, and for subsequently having had his
bar license suspended. Nixon, however, did not show that he had given counsel any
information that would have suggested the possibility of a self-defense claim. Moreover,
Nixon did not show any deficient act or omission resulting from counsel's alleged failure
to contact him, from counsel's alleged use of drugs, or from counsel's subsequent
criminal convictions and bar discipline. Moreover, Nixon did not show prejudice—he
5

did not show that, but for counsel's alleged deficiencies, he would likely not have
pleaded guilty, but would have insisted on going to trial. For all of the above reasons,
Nixon did not demonstrate that he had a meritorious claim.
In addition, Nixon did not offer reasons adequate to excuse his late filing. Nixon's
cause of action accrued on October 2,2004. He therefore had until October 2, 2005 to
file his petition. He did not file his petition for post-conviction relief until July 13, 2006,
more than nine months too late. Nixon did not proffer facts to show that his late filing
should be excused. While he asserted that he did not know he had any claims until he
consulted with present counsel, he did not indicate when he actually did consult with
counsel and learn about his potential claims. Nothing in the record suggests that his
filing on July 13, 2006 was reasonable and that his late filing should therefore be
excused.
In sum, the post-conviction court properly concluded that Nixon had not
demonstrated that his late filing should be excused in the "interests of justice."

Nixon originally filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis on May 16, 2006.
R96-103. However, even if his petition for post-conviction relief is counted from that
date, the petition was still over seven months too late.
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ARGUMENT
NIXON DID NOT PROFFER EVIDENCE SUFFICIENT TO MEET
HIS BURDEN TO DEMONSTRATE THAT HIS UNTIMELY
FILING SHOULD BE EXCUSED IN THE "INTERESTS OF
JUSTICE"
The post-conviction court properly denied Nixon's petition for post-conviction
relief.3 Nixon, who did not file within the PCRA time limitations, did not proffer
evidence sufficient to show that his failure to timely file should be excused in the
"interests of justice."
Background. The post-conviction court treated Nixon's petition for writ of
habeas corpus relief as a petition for post-conviction relief. The court noted that Nixon
"d[id] not challenge that [his] petition [wa]s untimely, but rather submit[ted] that the
petition me[t] the 'interests of justice' exception of the PCRA, which allows the Court to
excuse an untimely filing 'if the court finds that the interests of justice require.'" R163
(citing Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-107(3)). The court then ruled that Nixon had not met
the requirements of the "interests ofjustice" exception to the statute of limitations. R168.

3

The State does not dispute the timeliness of Nixon's appeal. Nixon filed his
notice of appeal after the trial court had announced its decision but before the trial court
entered its final order. Under rule 4(c), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the appeal is
"treated as filed after such entry and on the date thereof."

7

On appeal, Nixon challenges the court's determination that he failed to show that
his untimely filing should be excused in the "interests ofjustice." See Br. Appellant at
13-25.4
Controlling law.

In Adams v. State, 2005 UT 62,123 P.3d 400, the Utah

Supreme Court set forth the matters relevant to the "interests of justice" exception to the
PCRA statute of limitations: "An analysis of what constitutes an exception in the
'interests of justice' should involve examination of both the meritoriousness of the
petitioner's claim and the reason for an untimely filing." Id. at ^f 16. The court noted that
it did "not establish as a hard and fast rule that a petitioner must be able to demonstrate
both that his claim is meritorious and that he was justified in raising it late." Id.
"[RJather," the court stated, "we expect that the district court will give appropriate weight
to each of those factors according to the circumstances of a particular case." Id. "The
petitioner bears the burden of pointing to sufficient factual evidence or legal authority to
support a conclusion of meritoriousness." Id. at f 20. Likewise, a petitioner bears the
burden to offer reasons adequate to "justiffy] his late filing." See Benvenuto v. State,
2007 UT 53, f 34.

4

In Point I of his argument, Nixon states that "the trial court erred in granting
[the] State's motion to dismiss [his] petition for post-conviction relief when finding said
petition was untimely." Br. Appellant at 13. Review of the argument, however, shows
that Nixon is addressing the post-conviction court's determination that his "explanation
for untimely filing could be considered 'poor.'" Id. at 15. He does not argue that the
petition was timely, but rather that the reasons for the untimely filing were adequate. See
id.
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A.

Nixon did not proffer sufficient factual evidence or legal authority to support
a conclusion that his claims are meritorious.
In his post-conviction petition Nixon raised several ineffective assistance claims.

He alleged that his counsel, Geoffrey Clark, (1) failed to talk to him "about a self defense
claim," (2) failed to answer his phone and visited with Nixon only three times in six
months, (3) was "high on drugs" at the time of Nixon's decision to plead and at the
change of plea and sentencing, and (4) was later convicted on drug charges and had his
bar license suspended. R4.
To succeed on his post-conviction ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims, Nixon
had the burden of proving two elements. First, he had to establish constitutionally
deficient performance. He had to prove that the specific acts or omissions by his counsel
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 687-88, 690 (1984); Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 521 (Utah 1994). He also had
to overcome a strong presumption that trial counsel's performance fell within the "wide
range of reasonable professional assistance." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689; see also State
v. Taylor, 947 P.2d 681, 685 (Utah 1977); Parsons, 871 P.2d at 522. Whether trial
counsel satisfied his duty to investigate Nixon's case "depend[ed] critically" upon the
information Nixon supplied to him. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691.
Second, Nixon had to prove prejudice. As to his challenges to counsel's
performance in the plea context, Nixon had to prove "a reasonable probability that but for
counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to
trial." Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985); accord State v. Martinez, 2001 UT 12,

9

f 17, 26 P.3d 203. This inquiry turned, in large part, on the likelihood that Nixon could
have succeeded if he had gone to trial. See Hill, 474 U.S. at 59-60. Nixon's mere
assertion that he would not have pleaded guilty would not have been sufficient. "[M]ere
allegation that he would have insisted on trial but for his trial counsel's errors, although
necessary, is ultimately insufficient to entitle him to relief. Rather, [the court] look[s] to
the factual circumstances surrounding the plea to determine whether [he] would have
proceeded to trial." U.S. v. Clingman, 288 F.3d 1183, 1186 (10th Cir. 2002) (citation
omitted).
The post-conviction court properly ruled that Nixon had not presented a
meritorious claim. None of his claims demonstrated "that his counsel's performance was
deficient below an objective standard of reasonableness" or that he "was prejudiced by
his counsel's performance." R168.
1.

Nixon did not demonstrate that trial counsel's performance was deficient.
Nixon did not establish that trial counsel, Geoffrey Clark, was deficient for any of

the reasons he alleged in his petition.5

5

Nixon was represented in his criminal case by two attorneys, Geoffrey Clark and
Kristopher Greenwood. R57. Nixon did not argue in his petition for post-conviction
relief that trial counsel, Kristopher Greenwood, was ineffective. The State therefore
argued below that "[ejven assuming Mr. Clark's performance was deficient, [Nixon]
[wa]s not entitled to post-conviction relief if he received effective assistance of counsel
from Mr. Greenwood." R44. The trial court did not address this aspect of the State's
argument in its ruling granting the State's motion to dismiss the petition for postconviction relief. See Rl 62-69.
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Counsel's allegedfailure to discuss with Nixon the possibility of a self-defense
claim. Nixon did not demonstrate the counsel was deficient for not discussing with him
the possibility of a self-defense claim. Nixon failed to assert that he presented counsel
with any information that would have constituted a claim of self-defense. Nixon asserted
only that he and his wife had "a history of violence." R146. He did not assert that his
wife had ever been violent toward him. More significantly, he did not assert that she was
violent toward him during the incident that led to his being charged with attempted
murder or that he told counsel about any such violence. Because Nixon did not proffer
evidence that he gave counsel information that could provide a factual basis for a selfdefense claim, he cannot show that counsel was deficient for not discussing with him and
presenting a self-defense claim. "Counsel's actions are usually based, quite properly,
on . . . information supplied by the defendant. In particular, what investigation decisions
are reasonable depends critically on such information." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691.
Nixon did not show that he gave counsel any information that should have led
counsel to discuss, investigate, or present a self-defense claim. Thus, he did not
demonstrate that counsel was deficient for not presenting a self-defense claim.
Counsel9s allegedfailure to answer his phone and visit with Nixon more than
three times in six months. Nixon alleged that trial counsel never answered his phone and
only saw him three times. R97-101. How many times counsel did or did not answer his
phone or meet with the petitioner does not, by itself, establish whether counsel was
effective or not. "[A] court deciding an actual ineffectiveness claim must judge the
reasonableness of counsel's challenged conduct on the facts of the particular case, viewed
11

as of the time of counsel's conduct." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. Nixon did not explain
why counsel should have met with him more often. He did not proffer what information
counsel might have obtained from Nixon that would have changed his defense or
changed his decision to plead guilty. See State v. Strain, 885 P.2d 810, 818 (Utah App.
1994) (defendant's claim of inadequate investigation failed because defendant did not
show what evidence would have been obtained upon further investigation).
Thus, Nixon did not demonstrate that counsel was deficient for any alleged failure
to answer the phone or to visit more frequently.
Counsel's allegedly being "high on drugs" at the time ofNixon's decision to
plead and at the change of plea and sentencing. In his affidavit in support of his
petition, Nixon averred that he "found out after [his] sentencing that Geoffrey Clark was
likely to be high on drugs at the time of [his] pleas and [his] sentencing," and opined that
he therefore "could not rely on [Clark] for advice throughout the case." R15. The trial
court ruled that Nixon's allegation did not establish deficient performance. R166.
The court's ruling was proper. First, Nixon failed to assert or establish any
specific facts to support his allegations. Even if Clark had been using drugs during the
time that Nixon's case was pending, there was no evidence in the record to establish that
Clark was actually using drugs or was high on drugs at the time of Nixon's decision to
plead or at the time of his change of plea and sentencing hearing. No one—including the
prosecutor, the trial judge, or co-counsel for Nixon—raised any issue concerning Clark's
behavior or demeanor. The record contained no evidence that Clark was impaired in any
way. As the post-conviction court ruled, Nixon "ma[de] no claims as to how his
12

counsel's supposed drug use affected his performance. He d[id] not even allege that his
counsel acted strangely, or that he had any reason whatsoever to believe he might be on
drugs." R166.
Moreover, "under Strickland, the fact that an attorney used drugs is not, in and of
itself, relevant to an ineffective assistance claim. The critical inquiry is whether, for
whatever reason, counsel's performance was deficient and whether that deficiency
prejudiced the defendant." Berry v. King, 765 F.2d 451,454 (5th Cir. 1985); see also
State v. Coates, 786 P.2d 1182,1187 (Mont. 1990) ("absent any specific errors or
conduct identified in the trial that affected the trial's outcome [defense counsel's] cocaine
abuse is irrelevant to the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel"), overruled on other
grounds by Porter v. State, 60 P.3d 951 (Mont. 2002). Other than his claim that Clark
failed to present a self-defense claim, addressed above, Nixon did not allege any specific
errors. He did not address any specific error that might have resulted from Clark's use of
drugs and thus did not show deficient performance.
Counsel's subsequent conviction on drug charges and the suspension of his bar
license. Nixon claimed below that Clark had, at some point after sentencing, pleaded
guilty to possession and attempted distribution of drugs and that he had had his bar
license suspended. R4. As explained above, however, Nixon did not proffer any specific
error that might have resulted from Clark's use of drugs orfromhis subsequent criminal
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convictions and license suspension. Because he did not demonstrate any resulting error
in the trial process, he did not demonstrate a deficiency.6
2.

Nixon did not demonstrate that he suffered any prejudice.
The post-conviction court further ruled, "Not only has [Nixon] failed to show that

his counsel's performance was deficient, but he has also failed to show that he was
prejudiced by the performance." R167. The ruling was proper. Nixon did not
demonstrate prejudice. He did not show that but for counsel's errors there was a
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695.
As explained above, Nixon did not show that counsel was deficient for any of the
reasons he alleged. Where Nixon did not demonstrate a deficiency, he also could not
have demonstrated prejudice as a result of a deficiency. He could not have shown that
absent the deficiency, there was a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome.
Moreover, in this case, Nixon pleaded guilty. As explained above, where a
conviction results from a guilty plea, to demonstrate prejudice, a petitioner must show "a
reasonable probability that but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and
would have insisted on going to trial." Hill, 474 U.S. at 59.

Moreover, the fact that Clark's bar license was suspended is not sufficient, by
itself, to establish that Clark provided ineffective assistance of counsel. "Under the
Strickland standard, breach of an ethical standard does not necessarily make out a denial
of the Sixth Amendment guarantee of assistance of counsel." Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S.
157, 165 (1986).
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To determine whether a petitioner would not have pleaded guilty, an appellate
court will look at the factual circumstances surrounding the plea. Clingman, 288 F.3d at
1186. The inquiry turns, in large part, on the likelihood that the petitioner would have
succeeded if he had gone to trial. Hill, 474 U.S. at 59-60.
Here, as the court also stated, "[Nixon] was originally charged with attempted
murder. But as the result of his plea, he was only convicted of aggravated assault, a
third-degree felony." Rl67-68. Thus, he received favorable treatment for his plea
agreement.
Moreover, nothing in the record suggests a likelihood that Nixon would havesucceeded, had he gone to trial. See Hill, 474 U.S. at 59-60. As explained, Nixon did
not show that he had a viable self-defense claim that could likely have motivated him to
go to trial. Moreover, in the words of the post-conviction court, he offered no other
"justifiable reason in his petition or memoranda for him to have gone to trial on the
attempted murder charge, rather than plead guilty to the third-degree felony." R168.
Under these circumstances, Nixon did not show a probability that, but for some
deficient conduct, he would not have pleaded guilty, but would have insisted on going to
trial. Thus, he did not demonstrate any prejudice.
B.

Nixon did not offer reasons adequate to justify his late filing.
The trial court entered judgment in Nixon's criminal case on September 2,2004.

R94. Nixon had thirty days, or until October 2, 2004, within which to file an appeal. See
Utah R. App. P. 4(a). He did not file an appeal. See R123. He therefore had one year, or
until October 2, 2005, within which to file a petition for post-conviction relief. See Utah
15

Code Ann. § 78-35a-107(l) and (2)(a). Nixon did not file his petition until July 13,2006,
more than nine months after the PCRA time limit had expired, when he filed it in the
wrong district. See R3. Even Nixon's erroneous filing of a writ of error coram nobis,
his first post-conviction filing, did not occur until May 16, 2006, more than seven months
after the PCRA time limit had expired. See R96-103.
Nixon claimed in his petition that counsel did not tell him that he "had a defense
of self-defense to the aggravated assault charge" and that he "did not become aware of
the availability of the defense until more than 30 days after [he] had made a plea bargain
and was sentenced." R15. He also claimed that he "found out after [his] sentencing that
Geoffrey Clark was likely to [have been] high on drugs at the time of [his] pleas and [his]
sentencing." Id. Nixon did not, however, indicate when he became aware of these
matters. He did not indicate that he did not learn of these matters in time to file a timely
post-conviction petition. Nixon proffered evidence to demonstrate that he did not know
of these matters "until more than 30 days after [he] had made a plea bargain and was
sentenced," i.e., during the 30-day period during which he could have filed a timely
appeal. R15. He did not, however, assert that he did not learn about them during the
period when he could have filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief. He asserted

As noted, the petition did not arrive in the Second District and was not received
by Judge Heffernan until May 25, 2007, more than 19 months late.
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that he did not know about these matters until he consulted with current counsel, but he
did not indicate when, in fact, consultation with current counsel occurred. See R147.
Nixon therefore failed to indicate when he first learned of the availability of a selfdefense claim or whether it was before or after the PCRA statute of limitations had
expired. Moreover, even assuming he did not learn about the claim until after the statute
of limitations had expired, he did not proffer evidence demonstrating that the filing of his
post-conviction petition followed within a reasonable period of time. Thus, the trial court
properly concluded that Nixon had not met his burden to proffer an adequate reason for
his untimely filing under the PCRA. See R186.
In sum, the trial court properly determined that Nixon's claims lacked merit, that
his explanation for his untimely filing was inadequate, and therefore that his late filing
could not be excused in the "interests of justice." Id. at 185-86.
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
The State requests oral argument. "[0]ral argument is a tool for assisting the
appellate court in its decision making process," Perez-Llamas v. Utah Court ofAppeals,
2005 UT 18, f 10, 110 P.3d 706, and "the only opportunity for a dialogue between the
litigant and the bench." Moles v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 654 P.2d 740, 743 (Cal. 1982).
In the case at bar, the decisional process would "be significantly aided by oral argument."
Utah R.App. P. 29(a)(3).

17

CONCLUSION
The post-conviction court correctly held that Nixon had not met his burden to
show that his failure to timely file his petition should be excused in the "interests of
justice." He did not demonstrate, as required, that his claims were meritorious or that he
had an adequate reason for his failure to timely file his petition. For these reasons, the
post-conviction court properly granted the State's motion to dismiss Nixon's petition for
post-conviction relief. The court's decision should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted this W day of
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, 2008.

MARKL. SHURTLEFF
Attorney General
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WEST'S UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
TITLE 78. JUDICIAL CODE
PART IV. PARTICULAR PROCEEDINGS
CHAPTER 35A. POST-CONVICTION REMEDIES ACT
PART 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS
§ 78-35a-104. Grounds for relief—Retroactivity of rule
(1) Unless precluded by Section 78-35a-106 or 78-353-107, a person who has been
convicted and sentenced for a criminal offense may file an action in the district
court of original jurisdiction for post-conviction relief to vacate or modify the
conviction or sentence upon the following grounds:
(a) the conviction was obtained or the sentence was imposed in violation of the
United States Constitution or Utah Constitution;
(b) the conviction was obtained under a statute that is in violation of the United
States Constitution or Utah Constitution, or the conduct for which the petitioner
was prosecuted is constitutionally protected;
(c) the sentence was imposed in an unlawful manner, or probation was revoked in an
unlawful manner;
(d) the petitioner had ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the
United States Constitution or Utah Constitution; or
(e) newly discovered material evidence exists that requires the court to vacate
the conviction or sentence, because:
(i) neither the petitioner nor petitioner's counsel knew of the evidence at the
time of trial or sentencing or in time to include the evidence in any previously
filed post-trial motion or post-conviction proceeding, and the evidence could
not have been discovered through the exercise of reasonable diligence;
(ii) the material evidence is not merely cumulative of evidence that was known;
(iii) the material evidence is not merely impeachment evidence;

and

(iv) viewed with all the other evidence, the newly discovered material evidence
demonstrates that no reasonable trier of fact could have found the petitioner
guilty of the offense or subject to the sentence received.
(2) The question of whether a petitioner is entitled to the benefit of a rule
announced by the United States Supreme Court, Utah Supreme Court, or Utah Court of
Appeals after the petitioner's conviction became final shall be governed by
applicable state and federal principles of retroactivity.

© 2008 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.

UTST§78-35a-104
U.C.A. 1953 § 78-35a-104

Page 2

Laws 1996, c, 235, § 4, eff. April 29, 1996.
<General Materials (GM) - References, Annotations, or Tables>

LAW REVIEW AND JOURNAL COMMENTARIES
Eiorton, Utah T s DNA Actual Innocence Bill, 14 Utah B.J. 12 (Dec. 2001).
LIBRARY REFERENCES

Courts ^ ^

100(1)

Criminal Law ^^~ " " 1405, 1451, 1455, 1456.
Westlaw Key Number Searches: 110kl405; 110kl451;
106kl00(l).
C.J.S. Courts §§ 147 to 148.

110kl455;

110kl456;

NOTES OF DECISIONS
In general 1^
Construction and application 2^
Cumulative error 2
Effective assistance of counsel 13
Exhaustion of remedies 9>
Jurisdiction 14.5
New trial 1J5
Newly discovered evidence 14
Pardons and parole 12
Perjured testimony 6>

Pleas £
Presence of accused £
Presumptions and burden of proof 1JD
Release of innocent prisoners 5
Review 16
Sentence and punishment 11
Substantial or prejudicial denial of rights 3.
1^. In general
A justice court defendant does not have a right to elect between filing for a trial
de novo, thereby waiving constitutional claims, or filing for post-conviction
relief. Lucero v. Kennard, 2005, 125 P.3d 917, 539 Utah Adv. Rep. 21, 2005 UT 79.
Criminal Law ^-*r~

260.13

Any issues that were not addressed on direct appeal but could have been raised may
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WEST'S UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
TITLE 78. JUDICIAL CODE
PART IV. PARTICULAR PROCEEDINGS
CHAPTER 35A. POST-CONVICTION REMEDIES ACT
PART 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS
§ 78-35a-105. Burden of proof
The petitioner has the burden of pleading and proving by a preponderance of the
evidence the facts necessary to entitle the petitioner to relief. The respondent
has the burden of pleading any ground of preclusion under Section 78-35a-106, but
once a ground has been pled, the petitioner has the burden to disprove its
existence by a preponderance of the evidence.
Laws 1996, c. 235, § 5, eff. April 29, 1996.
<General Materials (GM) - References, Annotations, or Tables>
LIBRARY REFERENCES

Criminal Law ^"^
1613.
Westlaw Key Number Search: 110kl613.
NOTES OF DECISIONS
In general 1.
Constitutional rights £
Newly discovered evidence 3^
1.

In general

Writ of coram nobis, like one of habeas corpus, is civil in nature and applicant
has burden of showing that there is evidence he could not have known about at the
time of trial which would afford him relief; applicant must show that an error was
made and that he had no way of knowing about it and, further, that if he had known
about it, there would not have been a conviction in the case. State v. Mitchell,
1977, 569 P.2d 1117. Criminal Law ^-^

1409; Criminal Law ^-^

1613

2^. Constitutional rights
Placement of burden of proving that withdrawal of direct appeal was not knowing and
voluntary on petitioner for postconviction relief did not violate due process,
where appeal was filed and proceeded routinely until petitioner personally
requested that it be withdrawn. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14; Const. Art. 1, §§ 7, 12;
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WEST'S UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
TITLE 78. JUDICIAL CODE
PART IV. PARTICULAR PROCEEDINGS
CHAPTER 35A. POST-CONVICTION REMEDIES ACT
PART 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS
§ 78-35a-106. Preclusion of relief—Exception
(1) A person is not eligible for relief under this chapter upon any ground that:
(a) may still be raised on direct appeal or by a post-trial motion;
(b) was raised or addressed at trial or on appeal;
(c) could have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal;
(d) was raised or addressed in any previous request for post-conviction relief or
could have been, but was not, raised in a previous request for post-conviction
relief; or
(e) is barred by the limitation period established in Section 78-35a-107.
(2) Notwithstanding Subsection (1)(c), a person may be eligible for relief on a
basis that the ground could have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal, if
the failure to raise that ground was due to ineffective assistance of counsel.
Laws 1996, c. 235, § 6, eff. April 29, 1996.
<General Materials (GM) - References, Annotations, or Tables>

LIBRARY REFERENCES

€=»1(

Criminal Law ^-*^

1426 to 1428, 1433, 1440.

Westlaw Key Number Searches:

110kl426 to 110kl428;

110kl433;

110kl440.

NOTES OF DECISIONS
In general 1^
Claims raised at trial 4.5
Constitutional rights 3
Construction and application £
Effective assistance of counsel 7
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WEST'S UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
TITLE 78. JUDICIAL CODE
PART IV. PARTICULAR PROCEEDINGS
CHAPTER 35A. POST-CONVICTION REMEDIES ACT
PART 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS
§ 78-35a-107. Statute of limitations for postconviction relief
(1) A petitioner is entitled to relief only if the petition is filed within one
year after the cause of action has accrued.
(2) For purposes of this section, the cause of action accrues on the latest of the
following dates:
(a) the last day for filing an appeal from the entry of the final judgment of
conviction, if no appeal is taken;
(b) the entry of the decision of the appellate court which has jurisdiction over
the case, if an appeal is taken;
(c) the last day for filing a petition for writ of certiorari in the Utah Supreme
Court or the United States Supreme Court, if no petition for writ of certiorari is
filed;
(d) the entry of the denial of the petition for writ of certiorari or the entry of
the decision on the petition for certiorari review, if a petition for writ of
certiorari is filed; or
(e) the date on which petitioner knew or should have known, in the exercise of
reasonable diligence, of evidentiary facts on which the petition is based.
(3) If the court finds that the interests of justice require, a court may excuse a
petitioner's failure to file within the time limitations.
(4) Sections 77-19-8, 78-12-35, and 78-12-40 do not extend the limitations period
established in this section.
Laws 1995, c. 82, § 1, eff. May 1, 1995; Laws 1996, c. 235, § 7, eff. April 29,
1996; Laws 2004, c. 139, § 2, eff. May 3, 2004.
Codifications C. 1953, § 78-12-31.1.
<General Materials (GM) - References, Annotations, or Tables>

HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES
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Laws 2004, c. 139, in subsec. (4) added "77-19-8",
Prior Laws:
Laws 1979, c. 133.
LIBRARY REFERENCES

Criminal Law

€==>
^"*^

1586.

Westlaw Key Number Search:

110kl586.

NOTES OF DECISIONS
In general !2
Construction and application £
Interests of justice 5
Pardons and parole 2
Purpose 3^
Tolling of limitations j>
Validity of prior law 1^
,1. Validity of prior law
Three-judge panel that held three-month statute of limitations for habeas corpus
petitions unconstitutional did so pursuant to "judicial power of the state" and
holding thus had binding effect of stare decisis on other panels of Court of
Appeals; to hold otherwise would be to disregard nature of Court of Appeals1
jurisdiction, manner in which it must act, and necessity for uniformity and
predictability in law established by panels of Court of Appeals. Const. Art. 8, §
1;
U.C.A.1953, 78-2a-l, 78-2a-2(2); U.C.A.1953, 7 8-12-31.1 (1) (Repealed) . Renn v.
Utah State Bd. of Pardons, 1995, 904 P.2d 677.

Courts

^-^

90(2)

Statute of limitations governing writ of habeas corpus merited review under open
courts provision of state constitution, in light of nature of habeas relief as
basic individual right, and in light of nature of prisoners as group that needed
protection due to their isolation in society and lack of political influence.
U.C.A.1953, 78-12-31.1; Const. Art. 1, § 11. Currier v. Holden, 1993, 862 P.2d

€=>

1357, certiorari denied 870 P. 2d 957. Constitutional Law ^-^
Of Actions

^-*

328;

Limitation

4 (2)

Inflexible three-month statute of limitations governing habeas relief without any
exception for excusable delay was unreasonable and, thus, unconstitutional under
open courts provision of state constitution; prisoners' interests in protecting
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Rule 65C. Post-conviction relief.
(a) Scope. This rule shall govern proceedings in all petitions for post-conviction relief filed under Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-101 et
seq., Post-Conviction Remedies Act.
(b) Commencement and venue. The proceeding shall be commenced by filing a petition with the clerk of the district court in the
county in which the judgment of conviction was entered. The petition should be filed on forms provided by the court. The court may
order a change of venue on its own motion if the petition is filed in the wrong county. The court may order a change of venue on
motion of a party for the convenience of the parties or witnesses.
(c) Contents of the petition. The petition shall set forth all claims that the petitioner has in relation to the legality of the conviction or
sentence. Additional claims relating to the legality of the conviction or sentence may not be raised in subsequent proceedings except
for good cause shown. The petition shall state:
(c)(1) whether the petitioner is incarcerated and, if so, the place of incarceration;
(c)(2) the name of the court in which the petitioner was convicted and sentenced and the dates of proceedings in which the conviction
was entered, together with the court's case number for those proceedings, if known by the petitioner;
(c)(3) in plain and concise terms, all of the facts that form the basis of the petitioner's claim to relief;
(c)(4) whether the judgment of conviction, the sentence, or the commitment for violation of probation has been reviewed on appeal,
and, if so, the number and title of the appellate proceeding, the issues raised on appeal, and the results of the appeal;
(c)(5) whether the legality of the conviction or sentence has been adjudicated in any prior post-conviction or other civil proceeding,
and, if so, the case number and title of those proceedings, the issues raised in the petition, and the results of the prior proceeding;
and
(c)(6) if the petitioner claims entitlement to relief due to newly discovered evidence, the reasons why the evidence could not have
been discovered in time for the claim to be addressed in the trial, the appeal, or any previous post-conviction petition.
(d) Attachments to the petition. If available to the petitioner, the petitioner shall attach to the petition:
(d)(1) affidavits, copies of records and other evidence in support of the allegations;
(d)(2) a copy of or a citation to any opinion issued by an appellate court regarding the direct appeal of the petitioner's case;
(d)(3) a copy of the pleadings filed by the petitioner in any prior post-conviction or other civil proceeding that adjudicated the legality
of the conviction or sentence; and
(d)(4) a copy of all relevant orders and memoranda of the court.
(e) Memorandum of authorities. The petitioner shall not set forth argument or citations or discuss authorities in the petition, but these
may be set out in a separate memorandum, two copies of which shall be filed with the petition.
(f) Assignment. On the filing of the petition, the clerk shall promptly assign and deliver it to the judge who sentenced the petitioner. If
the judge who sentenced the petitioner is not available, the clerk shall assign the case in the normal course.
(g)(1) Summary dismissal of claims. The assigned judge s hall review the petition, and, if it is apparent to the court that any claim
has been adjudicated in a prior proceeding, or if any claim in the petition appears frivolous on its face, the court shall forthwith issue
an order dismissing the claim, stating either that the claim has been adjudicated or that the claim is frivolous on its face. The order
shall be sent by mail to the petitioner. Proceedings on the claim shall terminate with the entry of the order of dismissal. The order of
dismissal need not recite findings of fact or conclusions of law.
(g)(2) A petition is frivolous on its face when, based solely on the allegations contained in the pleadings and attachments, it appears
that:
(g)(2)(A) the facts alleged do not support a claim for relief as a matter of law;
(g)(2)(B) the claims have no arguable basis in fact; or
(g)(2)(C) the petition challenges the sentence only and the sentence has expired prior to the filing of the petition.
(g)(3) If a petition is not frivolous on its face but is deficient due to a pleading error or failure to comply with the requirements of this
rule, the court shall return a copy of the petition with leave to amend within 20 days. The court may grant one additional 20 day
period to amend for good cause shown.
(g)(4) The court shall not review for summary dismissal the initial post-conviction petition in a case where the petitioner is sentenced
to death.
(h) Service of petitions. If, on review of the petition, the court concludes that all or part of the petition should not be summarily
dismissed, the court shall designate the portions of the petition that are not dismissed and direct the clerk to serve a copy of the
petition, attachments and memorandum by mail upon the respondent. If the petition is a challenge to a felony conviction or sentence,
the respondent is the state of Utah represented by the Attorney General. In all other cases, the respondent is the governmental entity
that prosecuted the petitioner.

[I) Answer or other response. Within 30 days (plus time allowed under these rules for service by mail) after service of a copy of the
petition upon the respondent, or within such other period of time as the court may allow, the respondent shall answer or otherwise
-espond to the portions of the petition that have not been dismissed and shall serve the answer or other response upon the petitioner
n accordance with Rule 5(b). Within 30 days (plus time allowed for service by mail) after service of any motion to dismiss or for
summary judgment, the petitioner may respond by memorandum to the motion. No further pleadings or amendments will be
jermitted unless ordered by the court.
j ) Hearings. After pleadings are closed, the court shall promptly set the proceeding for a hearing or otherwise dispose of the case.
The court may also order a prehearing conference, but the conference shall not be set so as to delay unreasonably the hearing on the
rterits of the petition. At the prehearing conference, the court may:
j ) ( l ) consider the formation and simplification of issues;
j)(2) require the parties to identify witnesses and documents; and
j)(3) require the parties to establish the admissibility of evidence expected to be presented at the evidentiary hearing.
k) Presence of the petitioner at hearings. The petitioner shall be present at the prehearing conference if the petitioner is not
epresented by counsel. The prehearing conference may be conducted by means of telephone or video conferencing. The petitioner
;hall be present before the court at hearings on dispositive issues but need not otherwise be present in court during the proceeding.
The court may conduct any hearing at the correctional facility where the petitioner is confined.
I) Discovery; records. Discovery under Rules 26 through 37 shall be allowed by the court upon motion of a party and a determination
hat there is good cause to believe that discovery is necessary to provide a party with evidence that is likely to be admissible at an
evidentiary hearing. The court may order either the petitioner or the respondent to obtain any relevant transcript or court records.
m) Orders; stay.
m ) ( l ) If the court vacates the original conviction or sentence, it shall enter findings of fact and conclusions of law and an appropriate
>rder. If the petitioner is serving a sentence for a felony conviction, the order shall be stayed for 5 days. Within the stay period, the
•espondent shall give written notice to the court and the petitioner that the respondent will pursue a new trial, pursue a new
sentence, appeal the order, or take no action. Thereafter the stay of the order is governed by these rules and by the Rules of
\ppellate Procedure.
m)(2) If the respondent fails to provide notice or gives notice that no action will be taken, the stay shall expire and the court shall
deliver forthwith to the custodian of the petitioner the order to release the petitioner.
;m)(3) If the respondent gives notice that the petitioner will be retried or resentenced, the trial court may enter any supplementary
orders as to arraignment, trial, sentencing, custody, bail, discharge, or other matters that may be necessary and proper,
[n) Costs. The court may assign the costs of the proceeding, as allowed under Rule 54(d), to any party as it deems appropriate. If the
Detitioner is indigent, the court may direct the costs to be paid by the governmental entity that prosecuted the petitioner. If the
Detitioner is in the custody of the Department of Corrections, Section 64-13-23 and sections 78-7-36 through 78-7-43 govern the
manner and procedure by which the trial court shall determine the amount, If any, to charge for fees and costs.
[o) Appeal. Any final judgment or order entered upon the petition may be appealed to and reviewed by the Court of Appeals or the
Supreme Court of Utah in accord with the statutes governing appeals to those courts.
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IN THE SECOND J U D I C l ^ ^
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
t

CALVIN LEE NIXON,

CUURT

RULING GRANTING
STATE'S MOTION TO
DISMISS PETITION FOR
POST-CONVICTION
RELIEF

Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF UTAH,

\37MCT

0CT 2

5 2002

Respondent.

Case No. 070903073
Judge Pamela G. Heffernan

Petitioner Calvin Lee Nixon filed a petition for post-conviction relief on May 11,
2007, under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act (PCRA), Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-101
et seq. Respondent State of Utah moved to dismiss the petition pursuant to rules 12(b)(6)
and 65C of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Petitioner thenfileda response to the
motion, and Respondent filed a reply. After consideringthe petition and the memoranda
filed by both parties, the Court grants the State's motion to dismiss the petition.
In his petition for relief, Petitioner asserts that he is entitled to a new trial based
on the ineffective assistance of counsel. Petitioner claims that his counsel, Geoffrey
Clark, failed to discuss the possibility of a self-defense claim with his client, never
answered his phone, and only met with Petitioner three times. Further, Petitioner claims
his counsel "was likely to be high on drugs at the time of Petitioner's plea and
settlement." Memorandum in Support of Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, p. 4.
I. The "Interests of Justice" Exception
The State argues that the petition should be dismissed because it is untimely.
Petitioner was originally charged with one count of attempted murder in an incident
Ruling Granting State's Motion to Dismiss Petition for
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involving his former wife, but later pled guilty to one count of aggravated assault, a thirddegree felony. He was sentenced on September 2, 2004, to 0 to 5 years in the Utah State
Prison, but did not file his petition for post-conviction relief until May 11,2007. The
PCRA states that a petition must be "filed within one year after the cause of action has
accrued." Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-107(l). Petitioner does not challenge that the
petition is untimely, but rather submits that the petition meets the "interests ofjustice"
exception of the PCRA, which allows the Court to excuse an untimely filing "[i]f the
courtfindsthat the interests ofjustice require." Utah Code Ann. § 78-3 5a-107(3).
hi Adams v. State, 123 P.3d 400 (Utah 2005), the Utah Supreme Court analyzed
the "interests of justice" exception, declaring that it:
[S]hould involve examination of both the meritoriousness of the petitioner's claim
and the reason for an untimely filing. We do not establish as a hard and fast rule
that a petitioner must be able to demonstrate both that his claim is meritorious and
that he was justified in raising it late; rather we expect that the district court will
give appropriate weight to each of those factors according to the circumstances of
a particular case.
Id. at 404. In analyzing these two factors, "the court should rely not only on the
petitioner's memorandum in opposition but also on the initial petition itself in evaluating
the two factors we have identified" Id. If a petitioner's claims fail to meet the interests
of justice standard as set out in Adams, an untimely petition may rightly be dismissed.
See id. at 401,405.
A. Reason for Untimely Filing
With these points in mind, the Court will first examine Petitioner's reason for the
untimely filing. Petitioner's sole explanation forfilinghis petition more than 32 months
after his sentencing is limited to his assertion that he "did not become aware of the
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availability of a self-defense claim until consulting with his current counsel." Response
to State's Motion to Dismiss..., p. 5.
While the Court accepts that this explanation with regards to the self-defense
claim is a plausible reason for delay, it should be noted that Petitioner raised the very
same claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in his Petition for Writ of Coram Nobis
filed on May 16,2006, almost one year prior to his May 11,2007, petition for postconviction relief. Additionally, this Court denied the Petition for Writ of Coram Nobis
on May 30,2006, on the grounds that the appropriate procedure for claims such as
Petitioner's was post-conviction relief; yet Petitioner does not explain the 11-month delay
from that date infilinghis petition. Furthermore, Petitioner provides no explanation as to
why he did not previously raise his claims regarding his counsel's alleged drug use and
supposed failure to attend to his client.
At best, Petitioner's explanation for the untimelyfilingcould be considered
"poor." Nevertheless, the Utah Supreme Court has stated that a conclusively meritorious
claim "may require virtually no justification for a late filing." Adams, 123 P.3d at 404.
Therefore, the Court grants Petitioner the benefit of the doubt and considers the
meritoriousness of his claims.
B. Meritoriousness of Petitioner's Claims
In examining claims under the "interests of justice" exception, the Court "must go
one step further" than whether a claim is non-frivolous "and examine whether the claim
is meritorious. The petitioner bears the burden of pointing to sufficient factual evidence
or legal authority to support a conclusion of meritoriousness." Id. at 405. Ultimately, in
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this case, it is the Petitioner's utter lack of factual evidence to support his claims which
dooms his petition.
Petitioner's plea for relief is based on ineffective assistance of counsel. Under
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), ineffective assistance claims must pass a
two-prong test: (1) counsers performance must be deficient below an objective standard
of reasonableness, and (2) counsel's deficient performance must prejudice his client. Id.
at 687. Therefore, the Court will examine these two prongs in order to determine if
Petitioner's claims are meritorious.
1. Deficient Performance
a. Failure to Raise Self-defense Claim
Petitioner alleges that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because his
attorney failed to discuss with him the possibility of a self-defense claim. Under
Strickland, there is a strong presumption that counsel performed adequately. Id. at 690.
In order for Petitioner to overcome this presumption, he must allege facts which show
that he may have had a valid self-defense claim, and that his attorney failed to recognize
that claimfromthe stated facts. However, Petitioner fails to allege any facts which
would suggest he was entitled to a claim of self-defense. In fact, Petitioner does not even
allege that he did act in self-defense; he merely states that his attorney did not discuss a
self-defense claim with him.
Petitioner's only attempt at providing factual support for a possible self-defense
claim comes in his statement that 'Tetitioner and his former wife have a history of
violence, but the Petitioner was never apprised of the possibility of exerting the defense
of self-defense on the attempted murder charge by his former counsel." Response to
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State's Motion to Dismiss..., p. 4. Petitioner gives no details of this "history of violence"
and does not allege that his former wife had ever been violent towards him. More
importantly, he does not allege that she was violent towards him during the incident
which led to him being charged with attempted murder. Without providing some sort of
factual basis for a self-defense claim, Petitioner cannot show that his counsel was
deficient in not raising such a claim.
b. Drug Use
Petitioner also alleges that his attorney was "likely to be high on drugs" at the
time of his plea and sentencing. This allegation appears to be mere speculation based on
the fact that Petitioner's former counsel was later convicted of drug charges and had his
bar license suspended. Petitioner fails to allege any specific facts which would show that
his attorney was on drugs at the time of his plea or sentencing.
Further, even if Petitioner could show that his attorney was on drugs, drug use by
itself is irrelevant to a claim of ineffective assistance. See Berry v. King, 765 F.2d 451,
454 (5th Cir. 1985); State v. Coates, 786 P.2d 1182,1186 (Mont. 1990). "The critical
inquiry is whether, for whatever reason, counsel's performance was deficient and
whether that deficiency prejudiced the defendant." Berry, 765 F.2d at 454. Petitioner
makes no claims as to how his counsel's supposed drug use affected his performance. He
does not even allege that his counsel acted strangely, or that he had any reason
whatsoever to believe he might be on drugs. As such, Petitioner's bald allegation is
insufficient to show that his counsel's performance was deficient.
c. Other factors
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Petitioner also asserts that his attorney did not take his phone calls and only met
with him three times in six months. These allegations provide no insight into the
effectiveness of counsel's representation of the Petitioner. Therefore, Petitioner has
failed to carry his burden of showing that his counsel's performance was deficient.
2. Prejudice to Client
Not only has Petitioner failed to show that his counsel's performance was
deficient, but he has also failed to show that he was prejudiced by the performance. In
order to show prejudice, Petitioner must show that there would be a reasonable likelihood
of a more favorable outcome absent counsel's deficient performance. Strickland, 466
U.S. at 695.
Petitioner has argued that he was prejudiced because his attorney never discussed
with him the possibility of a self-defense claim. While the outcome may have been more
favorable for Petitioner if he had a valid self-defense claim, Petitioner makes no
assertions and provides no facts which would support such a claim. Without facts on
which to determine the possible validity of the self-defense claim, the Court cannot find
that Petitioner may have been prejudiced by the failure to raise the claim.
Additionally, Petitioner argues that he was prejudiced by his attorney's alleged
drug use during the plea and sentencing. But Petitioner does not specify how his
counsel's drug use affected his performance or prejudiced the outcome of his case.
Therefore, the Petitioner cannot show that he was prejudiced by his counsel's alleged
drug use.
Finally, the Court also notes that Petitioner was originally charged with attempted
murder. But as the result of his plea, he was only convicted of aggravated assault, a
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third-degree felony. Petitioner has provided no justifiable reason in his petition or
memoranda for him to have gone to trial on the attempted murder charge, rather than
plead guilty to the third-degree felony. He clearly received a benefit in the form of a
lighter sentence by pleading guilty to the reduced charge than he would have if convicted
of attempted murder. Petitioner has failed to show any prejudice resultingfromhis
counsel's performance.
Conclusion
Petitioner has not alleged sufficient facts in support of his claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel which would prevent the dismissal of the petition. From his claims
stated, he cannot show that he was prejudiced by his counsel's performance, nor can he
show that his counsel's performance was deficient below an objective standard of
reasonableness. As such, he cannot meet the two-prong test of Strickland. Petitioner's
claims lack merit under the standard described in Adams. Further, Petitioner has
provided an inadequate explanation for his delay in filing. The petition for postconviction relief does not meet the "interests of justice" exception, and is therefore
untimely under the PCRA.
Accordingly, the Court grants the State's Motion to Dismiss Petition for PostConviction Relief. Ms. Riley will please prepare the approp;
Dated this _ ^ ^ a y " o f October, 2007.

Pamela G. Heftema^^ge
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Respondent

Judge Pamela G. Heffernan

This matter came before the Court on the State's motion to dismiss the petition for
post-conviction relief. The Court has reviewed the petition and supporting memorandum. It
has also reviewed the State's motion to dismiss and the memoranda supporting and opposing
the motion. Now being folly advised in the premises, the Court makes the following
findings of fact, conclusions of law, and enters the following order granting the State's
motion and dismissing the petition as untimely.

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Petitioner was originally charged with one count of attempted murder, a second degree

felony.
2.

A second amended information was filed, and petitioner pled guilty to one count of

aggravated assault, a third degree felony.
3.

On September 2, 2004, petitioner was sentenced to an indeterminate term of 0 to 5

years in the Utah State Prison.
4.

Petitioner did not file any motion to withdraw his plea and did not file any direct

appeal.
5.

On May 16, 2006, petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus and petition for

writ of coram nobis in the underlying criminal case.
6.

On June 1, 2006, the Court denied the petitions, advising petitioner that the

appropriate procedure for the claims was under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act.
7.

On June 19, 2006, a motion for reconsideration was denied.

8.

Petitioner did not file current petition for post-conviction relief until May 11, 2007.

9.

Petitioner asserted that he was entitled to a new trial based on ineffective assistance of

counsel. Petitioner claimed that his counsel, Geof&ey Clark, failed to discuss the possibility
of a self-defense claim with him, never answered his phone, and only met with him three
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times. Further, petitioner claimed that his counsel "was likely to be high on drugs at the time
of Petitioner's plea and settlement" (Memo, in support of petition, p. 4).
10.

The State responded to the petition with a motion to dismiss, arguing that the petition

should be dismissed because it was untimely under Utah Code section 78-35a-107 of the
Post-Conviction Remedies Act (PCRA), because it was filed more than a year after the
accrual of petitioner's cause of action, and because it did not meet the interests of justice
exception.
11.

Petitioner did not challenge the fact that the petition was untimely, but asserted that

the petition met the "interests ofjustice" exception.
12.

Petitioner's sole explanation for filing his petition more than 32 months after his

sentencing was limited to his assertion that he "did not become aware of the availability of a
self-defense claim until consulting with his current counsel." (Resp. to State's Motion to
Dismiss . . . , p. 5).
13.

Petitioner did not explain the 11-month delayfromthe date his petition for writ of

coram nobis was denied until he filed his current petition for post-conviction relief.
14.

Petitioner also provided no explanation as to why he did not previously raise his

claims regarding his counsel's alleged drug use and supposed failure to attend to his client
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Petitioner was required to file his petition '"within one year after [his] cause of action

ha[d] accrued." See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-35a-107(l) (2002).
2.

Because petitioner did not file an appeal, his cause of action accrued on "the last day

for filing an appeal from the entry of the final judgment of conviction." Utah Code Ann. §
78-35a-107(2)(a).
3.

Petitioner was sentenced on September 2,2004. The last day petitioner could have

filed a notice of appeal was October 2, 2004. The one-year time limit therefore ran out on
October 2,2005.
4.

Petitioner did not file his current petition until May 11,2007. The petition was

therefore untimely.
5.

Section 78-35a-107(3) provides an exception to the statute of limitations. It states that

"[i]f the court finds that the interests of justice require, a court may excuse a petitioner's
failure to file within the time limitations." Id.
6.

The Utah Supreme Court analyzed the "interest ofjustice" exception in Adams v.

State, 2005 UT 62,123 P.3d 400 (Utah 2005), declaring that it "should involve examination
of both the meritoriousness of the petitioner's claim and the reason for the untimely filing."
Id. At 404.
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7.

"The petitioner bears the burden of pointing to sufficient factual evidence or legal

authority to support a conclusion of meritoriousness." Adams, 123 P.3d at 404.
8.

Petitioner's plea for relief is based on ineffective assistance of counsel. Under

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), ineffective assistance claims must pass a
two-prong-test: (1) counsel's performance must be deficient below an objective standard of
reasonableness, and (2) counsel's deficient performance must prejudice his client. Id.
9.

Petitioner's utter lack of factual evidence to support his claims dooms his petition.

Petitioner fails to allege any facts which would suggest he was entitled to a claim of selfdefense. In fact, petitioner does not even allege that he did act in self-defense; he merely
states that his attorney did not discuss a self-defense claim with him. Petitioner's only
attempt at providing factual support for a possible self-defense claim comes in his statement
that cTetitioner and his former wife have a history of violence." Petitioner gives no details
of this "history of violence." He does not allege that his former wife had ever been violent
towards him, and more importantly, does not allege that she was violent towards him during
the incident which led to him being charged with attempted murder. Without providing
some sort of factual basis for a self-defense claim, Petitioner cannot show that his counsel
was deficient in not raising such a claim.
10.

Petitioner also alleges that his attorney was "likely to be high on drugs" at the time of

his plea and sentencing. This allegation appears to be mere speculation based on the fact that
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Petitioner's former counsel was later convicted of drug charges and had his bar license
suspended. Petitioner fails to allege any specific facts which would show that his attorney
was on drugs at the time of his plea or sentencing.
11.

Even if Petitioner could show that his attorney was on drugs, drug use by itself is

irrelevant to a claim of ineffective assistance. See Berry v. King, 765 F.2d 451,454 (5th Cir.
1985); State v. Coates, 786 P.2d 1182,1186 (Mont. 1990). "The critical inquiry is whether,
for whatever reason, counsers performance was deficient and whether that deficiency
prejudiced the defendant." Berry, 765 F.2d at 454.
12.

Petitioner makes no claims as to how his counsel's supposed drug use affected his

performance. He does not allege that his counsel acted strangely, or that he had any reason
whatsoever to believe he might be on drugs. As such, Petitioner's bald allegation is
insufficient to show that his counsel's performance was deficient.
13.

Petitioner also alleges that his attorney did not take his phone calls and only met with

him three times in six months. These allegations provide no insight into the effectiveness of
counsel's representation. Therefore, Petitioner has failed to carry his burden of showing that
his counsel's performance was deficient
14.

Not only has Petitioner failed to showtihathis counsel's performance was deficient,

but he has also failed to show that he was prejudiced by the performance.
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15.

In order to show prejudice, Petitioner must show that there would be a reasonable

likelihood of a more favorable outcome absent counsel's deficient performance. Strickland,
466 U.S. at 695.
16.

Without facts on which to determine the possible validity of a self-defense claim, the

Court cannot find that Petitioner may have been prejudiced by the failure to raise the claim.
17.

Petitioner argued that he was prejudiced by his attorney's alleged drug use, but did

not specify how his counsel's drug use affected his performance or prejudiced the outcome
of his case. Therefore, Petitioner cannot show that he was prejudiced by his counsel's
alleged drug use.
18.

Petitioner was originally charged with attempted murder, but as the result of his plea,

was only convicted of aggravated assault, a third-degree felony. Petitioner provided no
justifiable reason for him to have gone to trial on the attempted murder charge, rather than
plead guilty to the third-degree felony. He clearly received a benefit in the form of a lighter
sentence by pleading guilty to the reduced charge, than he would have if convicted of
attempted murder.
19.

Petitioner failed to show that his counsel's performance was deficient. He also failed

to show any prejudice resulting from his counsel's performance. Therefore he cannot meet
the two-prong test of Strickland.
20.

Petitioner's claims lack merit under the standard described in Adams.
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21.

Furthermore, Petitioner provided an inadequate explanation for his delay in filing his

petition.
22.

The petition for post-conviction relief does not meet the "interests of justice"

exception, and is therefore untimely under the PCRA.

Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Court enters the
following:
ORDER
1. The State's motion to dismiss is GRANTED.
2. The petition for post-conviction relief is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
DATED this

day of November, 2007.
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APPROVED AS TO FORM:

Mary C. Corporon or Jared T. Hales
Counsel for Petitioner
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